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WINNING AND LOSING
WITH EMPLOYEE PARTICIPATION
Ellis Boalt
INTRODUCTION
Established in 1993 by the Secretaries of Labor and Com-
merce, the Commission on the Future of Worker-Management
Relations (the "Commission") investigated the current state of
worker-management relations in the United States with an eye
to recommending new methods or institutions to enhance
workplace productivity.1 The Commission concluded in its
initial Fact Finding Report that employee participation plans
("EPPs") may be the key to America's competitiveness and
standard of living:
Where employee participation is sustained over time
and integrated with other organization policies and
practices, the evidence suggests it generally improves
economic performance. If more widely diffused and
sustained over time, employee participation and labor
management cooperation may contribute to the nation's
competitiveness and standards of living.2
t A.B. Bowdoin College, 1966; J.D. Wayne State University, 1972. Many
of the ideas set out here first were developed by staff and collaborators at
LABOR NOTES, particularly Mike Parker and Jane Slaughter.
1 See ComIN ON THE FUTURE OF WORKER-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS, U.S.
DEP'T OF LABOR AND U.S. DEPVT OF COMMERCE, FACT FINDING REPORT xi
(1994) [hereinafter FACT FINDING REPORT]. The Commission was directed to
report back to the Secretaries in response to the following questions:
1. What (if any) new methods or institutions should be encouraged,
or required, to enhance work-place productivity though labor-
management cooperation and employee participation? 2. What (if
any) changes should be made in the present legal framework and
practices of collective bargaining to enhance cooperative behavior,
improve productivity, and reduce conflict and delay? 3. What (if
anything) should be done to increase the extent to which work-place
problems are directly resolved by the parties themselves, rather
than through recourse to state and federal court and government
regulatory bodies?
Id.
2 1d. at 56.
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The Commission's conclusion relied on two premises. The
first is that EPPs enhance worker rights by providing workers
with a measure of empowerment or democracy. Implicit in the
words and ideology of employment participation is a promise
that workers play a role in making workplace decisions that
usually are reserved to management. The second premise is
that EPPs result in higher productivity. Accepting these pre-
mises, proponents of participation plans concur with the
Commission's conclusion and endorse EPPs as the "win-win"
solution to problems of labor unrest and lagging productivity.
I challenge these premises. Modern participation plans
neither enhance worker rights nor increase productivity. The
Commission's conclusion that EPPs may contribute to our
nation's competitiveness and standard of living is contradictory
and weak. Rather, the primary effects of employment participa-
tion plans are the tightening of management control, the erosion
of worker rights, and the disorganization of unions. Corporate
America's plea that unions make sacrifices to accommodate
EPPs is disingenuous; employers implement participation plans
precisely in order to retain control over their workers.
Part I of this essay traces the history of employee participation
programs. Part II examines the productivity claims made with
respect to adoption of EPPs and urges workers to reject them
and organize independently. Part III argues that workers
should reject EPPs and organize independently in order to
protect their rights. The best way for workers to protect their
interests is not to plead with business or government to adopt
pro-worker policies. Until workers organize, and do so in large
numbers, genuine improvement of their lot will not occur.
I. FROM THE 1890s TO CURRENT PRACTICE:
A BRIEF HISTORY OF EMPLOYEE PARTICIPATION
Employers' concerns with productivity dictated worker
participation in the late 1800s. Pointing to the growing dispari-
ty of labor costs between the United States and its competitors
in England and Germany, industrial engineers of the 1890s
began to experiment with various methods of reducing unit cost.
The most famous of these methods was a wage-incentive scheme
developed by Frederick' W. Taylor. Under Taylor's scheme,
production standards and work methods were dictated by the
laws of science, and science left no room for bargaining. Taylor
promoted his system as a solution to labor unrest and productiv-
ity problems. He argued that scientific management would so
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increase the economic pie that it would be unnecessary for
workers and management to quarrel over how to divide the
surplus? This has a familiar ring today.
. Not surprisingly, trade unions were hostile to Taylor's
scheme. Strikes often accompanied the introduction of Taylorist
theories into unionized shops.4 The resulting upheaval sparked
experiments in union-management cooperation, and during the
1920s there were high hopes that structured, cooperative pro-
grams might resolve problems of poor labor relations. However,
most of these experiments were short-lived; they buckled under
the weight of the Great Depression, membership opposition, or
assertions of managerial prerogatives.5
It was not until the late 1970s that the topic of union-
management cooperation reemerged. "Quality of Work Life"
programs were the first to surface. The idea behind these
programs was that if management improved working conditions,
worker absenteeism would decline, quality would improve, and
productivity would increase. However, the focus in the 1970s
was on improving work-life; productivity was merely a welcome
by-product?
With the recession of the early 1980s, "Quality of Work
Life" programs were phased out, and new regimes, dubbed
"Employee Participation Plans," were introduced.' The idea
behind the new regimes was to move away from the expectation
that the focus of the cooperation programs should be on improv-
ing worker conditions. Instead, the focus of EPPs in the 1980s
3 See Sanford M. Jacoby, Union-Management Cooperation in the United
States: Lessons from the 1920s, 37 INDUs. & LAB. REL. REV. 18, 19 (1983)
(outlining the basics of Taylor's wage-incentive production scheme).
4 Id. at 19.
5 Id. at 18.
6 See MIKE PARKER AND JANE SLAUGHTER, WORKING SMART, A UNION
GumE TO PARTICIPATION PROGRAMS AND REENGINEERING 1-8 (1994).
7 Schemes today have dozens of different names: Autonomous Work
Groups, Call Manufacturing, Continuous Quality Improvement, Continuous
Improvement, Constant Improvement, Deming Method, Diversity Training,
Employee Ownership, Employee Participation Plan, Employee Involvement,
Gain Sharing, High-Performance Workplace, Japanese Management, Post-
Fordism, Quality Function Deployment, Quality Circles, Quality of Work Life,
Return On Quality, Self-Managed Work Teams, Task Forces, Team Concept,
Teams, Total Quality Control, Total Quality Management, Work Teams,
Worker-Management Partnerships, Worker-Management Cooperation,
Workplace Democracy, Workplace Innovations, World Class Manufacturing,
and Zero Defects.
1994]
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was on "teamwork." Management wanted to have employees
actively participate in work decisions for the primary purpose of
increasing productivity.'
Ideas about workers' roles with respect to decisions tradi-
tionally reserved to management thus have come full circle. In
the 1980s, the focus of participation plans remained on produc-
tivity. Workers' roles in the 1990s, however, are diminishing
drastically. Today, systems of "total quality management" allow
employers to set the course for organizing and controlling the
workplace. Modern EPPs are used as a vehicle for aligning
employee activity with production goals.9
II. EMPLOYEE PARTICIPATION, PRODUCTIVITY,
AND WORKER SOLIDARITY
Modern employment participation plans neither enhance
worker rights nor contribute to productivity. By allowing
management to control workplace decisions, EPPs naturally
undermine unions' efforts to secure worker participation.
Unions are workers' natural allies; they represent the most
zealous advocacy of workers' rights. By undercutting union
activity, modern plans erode workers' rights. ° Employee par-
ticipation plans cannot be justified on the grounds that they
enhance workers' quality of life.
Similarly, EPPs cannot be justified on the grounds that they
enhance productivity. The Commission erroneously concluded
that employee participation plans may be the key to U.S. com-
petitiveness. This conclusion is based on three studies, each of
which found that increased economic productivity ensued when
participation was combined with changes in employment prac-
tices, manufacturing policies, and decision-making procedure."
8 See PARKER & SLAUGHTER supra note 6 (noting that the 1980s was an era
in which management encouraged workers to take responsibility for produc-
tion increases and to pressure fellow workers for not pulling their load).
9 Id. (explaining that total quality management places emphasis on top
management's setting the course and organizing the workplace so that
decisions "cascade down").
10 See infra notes 18-20 and accompanying text.
n See FACT FINDING REPORT, supra note 1, at 46 (citing studies examining
systematic forms of workplace changes at Xerox, in an international sample of
auto assembly plants, and in a sample of plants in the steel industry, in
support of the conclusion that the more systematic the involvement efforts, the
greater the economic benefits); see also infra notes 12-15 and accompanying
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The first of these studies occurred at a Xerox plant in which
Xerox recognized the union without resistance and gave workers
a no-layoffs guarantee.'2 The second study surveyed automo-
bile plants in seventeen countries and concluded that a commit-
ment to employment security or an absolute "no-layoff' policy
probably is essential for productivity to increase."3 The third
study the Commission cited in reference to its conclusion that
employment participation plans enhance economic productivity
reviewed fifteen human resource practices in the steel indus-
try.14 It found that the firms with the highest performing
practices are unionized. 5
None of these studies supports the conclusion that employ-
ment participation plans necessarily enhance productivity. The
Commission buried its recognition of this fact in the Report."
The Report states that productivity increased in "some cases"
and that the empirical studies showed "mixed results".17 Given
the paucity of evidence that EPPs directly enhance productivity,
and the fact that they erode workers' rights, endorsing EPPs as
the "win-win" solution to problems of labor unrest and lagging
productivity simply makes no sense.
III. WORKERS SHOULD REJECT EPPs
AND ORGANIZE INDEPENDENTLY
The interests of workers and management are adverse.
Workers desire good wages, short working days, and comfortable
working conditions. Management's primary interest is profit.
text.
' Joel Cutcher-Gershenfeld, The Impact of Economic Performance on a
Transformation in Workplace Practices, 44 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REv. 241, 244-
45, 258 (1991).
' John Paul MacDuffie & John F. Krafik, Integrating Technology and
Human Resources for High-Performance Manufacturing: Evidence from the
International Motor Vehicle Research Program, in TRANSFORMING ORGANIZA-
TIONS (Thomas A. Kochan & Michael Useem eds., 1992).
14 Casey Ichinoiski et al., The Effects of Human Resource Management
Practices on Productivity (March 1994) (Unpublished Study, on file with
Carnegie Mellon University).
15 Id.
See FACT FINDING REPORT, supra note 1, at 46 (noting that the studies
showing the largest positive effects on economic performance involve a
combination of workplace reforms).
17 See id., at 45.
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The National Labor Relations Act recognizes these competing
interests" and includes provisions that are tailored carefully to
protect both workers and management. For example, in an
effort to protect workers, section 8(a)(2) of the Act prohibits
management from sitting on both sides of the bargaining ta-
ble.' 9 To protect management, the Act prohibits a union from
restraining or coercing an employer in choosing management
representatives. ° Given this adversarialism, workers' natural
allies are not their employers, but other workers, including
workers in competing and foreign companies. By organizing
themselves internationally, workers can eliminate price compe-
tition based on differences in labor standards and thereby
equalize wages and working conditions everywhere. 2' The
elimination of this competition increases the bargaining power
of unions and thus promotes workers' rights.
Critics of unions argue that unions are too adversarial and
propose that unions cooperate with management in an effort to
enlarge the economic pie for all.22 It is true that unions are
adversarial, but adversarialism is the hallmark of our society.
Why should workplace relations be any different? Given the
18 The preamble to the National Labor Relations Act does not mention
shared labor-management interests. 29 U.S.C. §151-69 (1988). Rather, the
Act alludes to the competing interests of workers and management. The
Supreme Court acknowledged that worker and management interests are
diametrically opposed. See N.L.R.B. v. Insurance Agents Union, 361 U.S. 477,
488-89 (1980) (noting that such an antagonistic relationship is "part and
parcel" of the system that the Act recognizes).
" Section 8(a)(2) provides: "It shall be an unfair labor practice for an
employer to dominate or interfere with the formation or administration of any
labor organization or contribute financial or other support to it." 29 U.S.C.
§ 158(a)(2) (1988).
20 Section 8(b)(1)(B) provides: "It shall be an unfair labor practice for a
labor organization or its agents to restrain or coerce an employer in the selec-
tion of his representatives for the purpose of collective bargaining or the
adjustment of grievances." 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(1)(B) (1988).
21 In Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 310 U.S. 469 (1940), the Supreme Court
explained that, "successful union activity, as for example consummation of a
wage agreement with employers, may have some influence on price competi-
tion by eliminating that part of such competition which is based on differences
in labor standards." Id. at 503.
22 Ford Motor Company's vice-president, Peter J. Pestillo, lamented the ad-
versarial nature of union relations and called for what he contradictorily
termed "the competitive view of collective bargaining." Hearings Before the
Comm'n on the Future of Worker-Management. Relations (March 28, 1993)
(statement of Peter J. Pestillo).
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overwhelming resurgence of corporations, and the recent decline
of unions, workers must adopt a broad strategy of aggressively
opposing cooperation with management; they must intensify the
struggle for international labor solidarity.' This most certain-
ly includes rejecting employee participation plans.
If a company demands that a union accept an EPP as a
condition of keeping a plant open, the union should accommo-
date the EPP with great caution and only after consultation and
discussion among its members. If a union decides to adopt an
EPP, it should implement a program consistent with a two-sided
bargaining model. The EPP should consist of employee-side
members and management-side members. Employee-side
members should be allowed to exercise their rights to caucus
separately, hire their own facilitators and experts, and take
issues back to the union for consultation or vote. Union officials
must be vigilant in monitoring the activities of the EPP. Final-
ly, as in all other collective bargaining, the union should de-
mand that in the event of an impasse, it retains the right to
strike or arbitrate. Limitations on EPPs are valuable guaran-
tees of labor independence and should not be bargained away.
CONCLUSION
Access to influence on traditional management prerogatives
is the bait floated by the Commission to unions in order to win
union support for EPPs. However, management keeps for itself
the final say in all of the plans. The EPPs enhance manage-
ment control, not productivity. Workers and union officials
become confused, worker ideology suffers, and working condi-
tions deteriorate.
Employee participation, like all other games, has losers. It
is an old game, so unions must respond as they always have.
Unfortunately, their message is not well heard today, and the
short term prospects for workers are bleak. Academics and
attorneys cannot solve the problems. However, workers can be
more optimistic in the long term, because organized worker
discontent inevitably will rise again. When it does, we all,
including the Commission, will see real participation directed to
a workers' agenda.
' For support of the idea that workers should intensify their struggle for
solidarity, see Wilson McLeod, Labor-Management Cooperation: Competing Vi-
sions and Labor's Challenge, 12 INDUS. REL. L.J. 233, 281-91 (1990).
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